The FBI, CISA, the U.S. Secret Service, and international partners from Germany and the United Kingdom published a joint advisory on October 20, 2026, warning that the SafePay ransomware group has compromised roughly 600 organizations across North America, South America, Europe, and Australia since August 2024. The advisory, designated AA26-293A under the StopRansomware initiative, identifies SafePay as one of the most active ransomware operations of 2026, hitting an estimated 15 to 30 organizations each month throughout the year.
What makes SafePay particularly relevant to business continuity planning is its documented approach to recovery obstruction. According to the advisory, operators stop the Windows Volume Shadow Copy Service — the built-in snapshot mechanism many organizations rely on for fast restore — and in some cases reset network-attached storage devices containing backups to factory settings, deleting all network-connected copies before deploying the encryption payload. The advisory notes that data encrypted by SafePay cannot be recovered without the decryption key, meaning organizations without offline copies face the full weight of that choice.
The group gains initial access primarily through compromised credentials, brute-force attacks, and exploited vulnerabilities on internet-exposed VPN and firewall devices. Once inside, it uses legitimate administrative tools such as WinSCP, RClone, AnyDesk, and ScreenConnect to move laterally and exfiltrate data before encrypting files.
The agencies recommend patching known exploited vulnerabilities on public-facing systems, enforcing multi-factor authentication, restricting administrative privileges, and segmenting networks to limit lateral movement. On the recovery side, they specifically call for offline, encrypted, and immutable backups — meaning copies that ransomware cannot reach through network access — with restoration procedures tested regularly. Organizations that suspect a SafePay intrusion are advised to isolate affected systems, preserve forensic evidence, and report to the FBI or CISA. The full advisory, including technical indicators and MITRE ATT&CK mappings, is available at cisa.gov.